As the country Nigeria cascades further down the lane of terrorist
perplexity and organised chaos, not a few have expressed the hope that perhaps,
the pathway to durable peace and security interconnects with the route to
active and responsive citizenship. Along this line, the notion is held that
citizens must not only complement the efforts of government but must also go
beyond the rudimentary and provide useful, intelligent and accurate information
required to halt terrorism. This view runs on the heels of the fact that
terrorists are human beings who live in the society with neighbours, family and
friends hence their ghostly garb must be unveiled by a responsive and
responsible citizenry. Any default from the above is considered as lethargical
and irresponsive.
Trite
as the above may appear, the proponents of this view appear to gloss over the
Hobbesian wavelength of reasoning that it is for the avoidance of a state of
nature where human life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short" that the idea of statehood was built. It is believed that the
absence of political order and law leads to unlimited natural freedoms, which
include the "right to all things" and thus the freedom to plunder,
rape, and murder as terrorists are wont to do.
To avoid this, free men contract with
each other to establish state institutions through a social contract in which
they all gain security in return for subjecting themselves to its sovereignty.
The central assertion of social contract approach is that law and political
order are not natural, but are instead human creations. The social contract and
the political order it creates are simply the means towards an end — the
benefit of the individuals involved — and legitimate only to the extent that
they fulfill their part of the agreement.
According
to Hobbes, citizens are not obligated to submit to the government when it is
too weak to act effectively to suppress factionalism and civil unrest. According
to other social contract theorists, citizens can withdraw their obligation to
obey or change the leadership, through elections or other means including, when
necessary, violence, when the government fails to secure their natural rights
or satisfy the best interest of society.
It
therefore follows that when citizens fulfill their own part of the agreement by
paying taxes and obeying all relevant laws necessary for the maintenance of law
and order, the government has no option than to keep its side of the social
contract, which comes with the security of lives and property. To expect one
part to stretch beyond its limits in the contract is an open invitation to
anarchy, which is sadly the case in Nigeria.
To avoid the descent to lawlessness, the crafters
of the Nigerian constitution, with foresight, penned the following in section
2b: "the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose
of government". The same constitution (as defective as it is) mandates the
President of Nigeria and the state Governors to swear on oath that "they
will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
that they will discharge their duties to the best of their ability, faithfully
and in accordance with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and
the law, and always in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity,
solidarity, well-being and prosperity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; and that they
will strive to preserve the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of
State Policy contained
in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; and that they
will devote themselves to the service and well-being of the people of Nigeria.
Based on the aforementioned, it becomes evident
that the task of preventing the wanton
destruction of the lives and property in
Nigeria since 2009 lies on the government and its agents. It therefore becomes
a thing of gross irresponsibility on the part of government for it to
statutorily expect the citizenry who do not have access to security vote of any
sort, to complement and go beyond it’s ineffective efforts at intelligence
gathering. Also, accusing hapless citizens of lethargy for not doing what is
constitutionally beyond their purview must be denounced for what it is, a gross
misnomer.
Besides, government and its agents haven’t
displayed the necessary bite in the fight against terrorism as statements
credited to the President in recent times further befuddle the citizenry. The
President openly declared in Ibadan in 2010 that "we know those that
are sponsoring the bomb explosions in the country and we will soon fish them
out in due course...we are compiling their names for arrest soon." The President also rushed
to the hasty defence of a millitant, illegal and criminal organisation (MEND)
after they claimed responsibility for the Independence Day bombing in
2010.
There is no gainsaying the fact that not a few
bombing disasters would have been averted in the country if proactive actions
were taken since October 1 2010. A peep into the objectives and operational
procedure of the Nigerian Department for State Security (DSS), Directorate of
Military intelligence (DMI), Naval, Air and Army Intelligence Corps would
reveal government’s complacency in the deployment of its full capacity on the
menace.
The truth remains that efforts have been made
in other climes by governments and appreciable successes have been recorded in
the global war on terror. US for instance may have not won the war on
terror but it has succeeded in protecting its citizens from domestic terrorism
after the 9/11 through pragmatic actions marshalled by their government (not
the citizenry). After 9/11, actions such as the integration and
strengthening of all security intels which led to the Department of Homeland security,
introduction of Homeland security and counter-terrorism as courses in American
universities, financial autonomy for homeland security, increased public
awareness and enlightenment, ubiquitous deployment of security intelligences
across the 50 states and the establishment of National Counter-Terrorism Centre
(NCTC) with the objective of "Leading the nation's effort to combat
terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information
with partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure
unity of effort".
These and other actions were taken by the
Bush administration and sustained by Obama and America is better for it, even
the threat of a repeat attack on the 10th anniversary of 9/11 did not
materialise. Coming to Nigeria, one cannot but ask, how many Nigerian
universities have introduced courses on domestic terrorism, counter-terrorism
or Conflict resolution at first and second-degree levels? Apart from what
University of Jos is doing and planning to do through its Conflict Resolution
Centre, how many government-funded agencies have demonstrated appreciable
interest in funding researches and academic programmes aimed at proffering
workable solutions out of this conundrum? Talk about the lunatic display of
doing the same thing all the time and expecting different results. How
integrated are our DSS, DMI and Police? Kidnappings brought to the fore, the
latent competitive jealousies between these lackluster agencies so much that
Mossad had to be brought in to unravel the kidnap of four Nigerian journalists
in Abia!
What effort has been made by our government
with a view to centralising and coordinating its witless attempt at
counter-terrorism? On the 3rd of January 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan
announced that he will appoint a special adviser on terrorism. He also
announced a series of anti-terrorism initiatives on Monday as he intends to
regain control after a wave of attacks in the last week of 2010 rocked the
country. The announcement came after Jonathan held emergency talks with
his security chiefs that concluded that the Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve
attacks were "acts of terror carried out by criminal elements within our
midst." "Mr. President in the next one week is to appoint a special
adviser on terrorism," then presidential spokesman Ima Niboro
said. "Mr. President is going to work with the National Assembly to
ensure the speedy passage of the anti-terrorism bill that is before the
assembly. "Niboro also said four new presidential committees would be launched,
including a group working on controlling explosives and another to promote
public security awareness.
The announcement was made on the day a
policeman was shot dead in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria, the latest in a
string of violent attacks in Northeastern Nigeria days after unidentified
arsonists burnt a church in the northern Nigerian city where Islamist militants
burnt two churches and killed six worshippers on Christmas Eve.
To enhance security, the government said it
would install CCTV cameras in public areas. (this was not done until Police HQ
was bombed in June 2011 and the contracts were awarded only for the contractor
to install substandard CCTV cameras and when he was questioned, he identified
the top brass in the NPF and the Police Affairs ministry who collected
kickbacks that mortgaged the essence of the contract).
A special presidential taskforce would also be
established to control the circulation of explosives, while licensed weapons
would be inspected regularly to check on their use. Shortly after, Amb Waziri
was appointed as presidential Adviser and Coordinator of the Counter-terrorism
and terrorism assumed a higher gear in Nigeria. Shortly after again, Jonathan
wrote to the NASS asking for an increase in the salaries of his Security aides
particularly the ijaw-born Gen Owoeye Azazi, who according to Jonathan, is a
highly distinguished military tactician with his acquisition of FSS, MSS, DSS,
PSC+ all in a record time, was doing so much with so little a salary.
After all these, the spate of bombings even
assumed a frighteningly apocalyptic dimension as the battle was now taken to
the doorsteps of the president with the Police HQ bombing. The President, after
inspecting the Police headquarters wreckage remarked wryly "if the
bombers have their way, they will even bomb me". With the foregoing, it
would be unjustifiably reprehensible to blame the citizenry for this sad turn
of events.
Whilst not excusing the wives, parents and
friends of these bombers and kidnappers for not doing the needful, their
decision not come forward with information that may lead to the arrest of the
perpetrators of this menace must be respected. Stories abound of Nigerians who
take valuable information on bombers to Nigeria's security agencies only to end
up being harassed and persecuted to the point of being paraded before newsmen
as suspected terrorists.
A swift glance at workable and working
strategies adopted by other countries before their leadership asked the
citizenry to contribute their quota to the sustainability of the war on terror
would suffice.
In France the Direction de la Surveillance
du Territoire or Department of Territorial Surveillance (DST) serves the
same function as MI5 does in England. The central difference between the two organizations
is that MI5 has some oversight, while DST does not. DST’s two primary terrorism
concerns seem to be the Armed Islamic Fighting Group (GIA) and the Salafist
Preaching and Combat Group (SPCG).
This is in large part because “the main danger
confronting the country is that from international terrorist groups, especially
emanating from Islamist militants based in former French colonies such as
Algeria and other Maghreb Countries”.As such the DST’s three central missions
are counter-terrorism, counter-espionage, and “protection of France’s economic
and scientific infrastructure”, a responsibility it shares with the Economic
Security and Protection of National Assets Department.
DST relies on several means of acquiring the
needed intelligence to do its job. Amongst these tactics are the use of
informers, “community sourced information provided by the general community”,
monitoring activities of “immigrants entering France”, and “foreign sourced
data” that is provided by the Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure
(DGSE), the French equivalent of MI6.
For example, DST capably uses its “extensive
network of informers” or individuals who may have been planted within the
French Muslim Community. In many cases, these sources of HUMINT are “convicted
terrorist felons who have gained amnesty in exchange for cooperating with
police and the security services”. As such these individuals can get access to
people, places and sources of information that the police or intelligence
authorities cannot. This information then goes into the Vigipirate program,
France’s “basic structure” for their counter-terrorism program.
Community-sourced information comes from the relationship between the DST and
community leaders. Further measures taken to keep the local populace informed
include “integrated media campaigns explaining the purpose of counter-terrorism
measures and why they are being directed against certain groups”.
The DST’s monitoring activities can be
classified as attempts to make sure that those entering France are doing it for
appropriate (non-criminal) reasons. To guarantee this, France mandates that
“all non-citizens are required to carry an Identity card” and that “French
nationals running hotels and guest houses must inform the authorities of
arrival and departure of any immigrants to who they provide lodging”. Finally,
France’s “raw intelligence data feed[s] directly into domestic threat
assessments and associated programs for physical protection and
hardening”.
The DST, like many of its foreign counterparts,
is not allowed to arrest people; hence, when it discovers a threat, it
collaborates with “two main agencies in conducting surveillance over immigrant
communities and formulating vulnerability risk assessments for general
terrorist mitigation purposes". As mentioned previously, the DST has no
entity or individual overseeing it for accountability. As such, some of its
critics have argued that its carte blanche authority is a problem and oversight
of its activities should be provided.
The Canadian intelligence has some key
similarities, but also a few interesting differences with other national
intelligence organizations. In Canada, the internal intelligence agency is the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service or CSIS. The CSIS, like others, is in charge
of information pertaining to domestic intelligence threats and similar to its
counterparts in that it has no arresting authority, however, the similarities
stop there. Because Canada is not a target of terrorist attacks so much as a
source for recruitment, fund-raising, and a safe haven, the tasks that the CSIS
undertake are vastly different from what the MI5 or the DST might be required
to handle.
As such Canada’s central terrorist problem
largely relates to “spillover effects of overseas conflicts” and as such Canada
continues “to act as a highly important hub of political, financial, and
logistical support”. The CSIS is split into three main areas: a threat
assessment unit which “prepares and disseminates time-sensitive evaluations
about the scope of immediacy of terrorist threats posed by groups and
individuals in Canada”, case officers, who “conduct interviews within local
communities to explain the work of intelligence services, as well as to assess
the likelihood of violence taking place”, and finally providing input to the
“enforcement information index”.
The CSIS places considerable importance on
maintaining an efficient working relationship with police, largely because the
agency has no arresting powers of its own. As far as oversight is concerned,
the CSIS reports to the Security and Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), and
the Executive Directorate of the Inspector General (EDIG) who reports to the
solicitor general.
The two central obligations of these
organizations are “carrying out audits of CSIS, and investigating complaints
made against the service’s officers”. Canada takes these precautions due
to the fact that “over the past decade, terrorists linked to Hamas, Hezbollah,
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the GIA, al-Qaeda, PIRA, The Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Babbar Khalsa, and the Dash
mesh regiment” have been known to enter Canada “generally posing as refugees-to
engage in various front and organizational support activities”.
Australia’s internal security agency is the
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Australia has not
traditionally been a target of terrorist attacks. However, with the
governments’ recent support of the United States in the War on Terror and its
intervention in East Timor it has become a target to Islamic extremists,
specifically Jemaah Islamiyah, a Southeast Asian affiliate of Al-Qaeda. The
ASIO “has no powers of arrest”, but does have a limited ability to “detain and
question” a suspect “before a prescribed authority”. Additionally, the
agency “collects and receives raw intelligence from a variety of sources”,
including by relying “more heavily on community-based information”, and
“open-source information together with data gleaned from search, entry, and surveillance
operations from an important adjunct to HUMINT” (human intelligence).
To assure the surrounding community of its
intentions, the ASIO “has moved to provide greater clarity about the legality,
propriety, and effectiveness of the agency’s work”; the success of this effort
has been demonstrated by greater information provided by the Australian
populace. “More than 5,000 voluntary submissions to ASIO in 2002” were received
“responding to the government’s call for a public that is “alert but not alarmed".
Oversight of the ASIO is conducted through the attorney-general’s
Inspector-General office of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), with “external
security performed through the Parliamentary Joint Committee (PJC)”.
IGIS oversight includes a vast amount of
information including but not limited to “operational cases and files”,
“official use of alternative documentation”, and access to and use of financial
information obtained from the Australian taxation office and the Australian
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre”. The terrorist threat to Australia is
not as serious as the one to the United States, the UK, and France, but it is
rising, and it appears that the Australians are not only aware of this rising
threat that Islamists pose, but are taking measures to ensure that these
threats are adequately addressed in both the law enforcement arena and the
military arena with its involvement in the war on terror.
Both the United States and the European Union
have produced counter-terrorism strategies, but note the contrasts in
their respective documents. The American strategy has four main
components:
Defeat terrorist organizations of global
reach;
Deny further sponsorship, support, and
sanctuary to terrorists;
Diminish underlying conditions that terrorists
seek to exploit;
Defend the homeland and extend defenses
abroad.
The European Union’s Counter-terrorism Strategy
also has four main components:
Prevent people turning to terrorism by
tackling root causes;
Protect citizens and infrastructure;
Pursue and investigate terrorists and
bring them to justice;
Respond (prepare) to manage and minimize
consequences of an attack.
On the whole, both strategies lay emphasis on
fighting terrorism to a standstill and bringing them to justice while
minimising the effects of their attacks on the populace. None of the above
finds its truest expression in the Nigerian experience thus far and until
concrete efforts are strategically made with an eye on zero-tolerance for
terrorism of any hue, governmental irresponsibility must not be misconstrued or
decorated on the altar of citizenship lethargy.
Atayi Babs ©
2011
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